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During the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, income differences
across social classes were compressed. Formal education was not an important
determinant of personal income. In this study, there was no difference in income
between white-collar and blue-collar families, although white-collar parents had
more education than blue-collar parents. In urban China, where population density
was high, couples of different occupational status appeared to make different
trade-offs between quantity and quality of children. Urban white-collar couples had
fewer, but better-educated, children than their blue-collar counterparts. In rural
areas, white-collar couples still had better educated children than blue-collar cou-
ples, but no difference was found in lifetime reproductive success. High population
density and an occupational structure that incidentally helped reinforce unequal
distribution of cultural capital in the population encouraged urban couples with
different levels of resources (i.e., cultural capital rather than income in this case) to
adopt different reproductive strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
All organisms with finite resources face two fundamental trade-offs
when it comes to reproduction (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992). First, they must
‘‘decide’’ how many resources to expend on reproduction instead of on
self-growth and maintenance. Second, they must determine how to divide
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the resources available for reproduction between the quantity and the
quality of their offspring (Clutton-Brock & Godfray, 1991; Lessells, 1991).
In this paper, I explore how and why married couples with different
occupational status in different parts of China adopt different reproductive
strategies. Successful reproductive strategies depend in part on the intensity
of competition. In other species, the density of con-specific competitors in
the environment is a reflection of this competition (MacArthur & Wilson,
1967). For individuals living in densely populated (or otherwise highly
competitive) environments, the most successful reproductive strategy is
often not to make the maximum number of offspring, but to make fewer,
better-invested ones (Low, 2000a, 2000b; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967).
Humans, of course, are more complex and variable than other species,
so we need additional measures. Still, human parental investment strategies
(like those of other species) are sensitive to the amount, distribution, and
accessibility of environmental resources (Lancaster, 1997; Low, 2000b).
When the marginal rates of return on investment in children’s ability to
survive, marry, and reproduce are high, we expect that parents would
respond to those investment opportunities, even at the expense of the number
of children (Charnov, 1982; Becker, 1991; Low, Clarke, & Lockridge, 1992).
Parental investment comes in many different forms. In modern socie-
ties, education is important because it is crucial for social mobility. Scholars
of education and social stratification suggest that, in all industrialized or
industrializing societies for which data are available, people believe those
who get ahead are those who get educated (see Deng & Treiman, 1997).
Thus, education cost constitutes a significant part of parental investment, at
least in modern societies.
With differentials in resource availability and opportunities for
better-educated children, we expect that married couples would adopt
different parental investment strategies in different environments. For exam-
ple, couples of relatively high occupational status (e.g., white-collar) might
opt for offspring quality over offspring quantity in urban settings where pop-
ulation density is high and the skilled labor market is competitive. On the
other hand, couples of lower occupational status (e.g., blue-collar) might
invest in offspring quantity instead of quality, if relatively limited resources
make it harder for them to invest more per child. In rural areas where popu-
lation density is low and the labor market is mainly based on unskilled labor,
we expect to see a lesser degree of differentiation in parental investment
strategies among couples of different occupational status (cf. Goody, 1983).
China is an interesting case in which to study parental investment
strategies for several reasons. During the first three decades of the People’s
Republic of China, people experienced dramatic social, cultural, and
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political transformation as a result of various government policies (Meisner,
1999; Schoppa, 2002; Ting, 2003, this issue). Many of these policies spe-
cifically aimed to equalize people’s access to material resources and edu-
cational opportunities by eliminating social stratification. These policies
included land reform, agricultural collectivization in rural areas, and
nationalization of urban industry (Schoppa, 2002). As a result, in rural areas
private ownership of land (and of all other forms of wealth except housing)
was abolished, and material resources became the common property of the
newly created communes and brigades (Stockman, 2000). The class struc-
ture of urban society was also transformed; private businesses were col-
lectivized. The whole urban population was then assigned to ‘‘work-units’’
by the communist government, through which welfare and social security
were provided (Stockman, 2000).
However, not only material resources are useful investments in chil-
dren: ‘‘cultural capital’’ also is important. In this study, the term has a
broader meaning than is usually recognized. That is, not only are parents
able to pass down the knowledge to their offspring because of their edu-
cational qualification and professional expertise (i.e., cultural capital in a
stricter sense), but also provide resources such as high-quality schooling and
collective goods associated with their work-units. Therefore, even though
education per se does not have the conventional exchange value for higher
income (or wealth), education leads to different professions of different
work-units, which in turn gives rise to differentials in fringe benefits.
Moreover, one might expect that people with different cultural capitals also
tend to be active in different circles (i.e., different networks), which at times
might be conducive to personal advancement through private but yet
selective association (see also Stockman, 2000).
Communist policies went some way toward interrupting the inheri-
tance of cultural capital down the generations, with an aim of reducing
inequalities of educational opportunity among social classes (Stockman,
2000). In particular, from the beginning of the communist regime in 1949,
through the Cultural Revolution which ended in 1976, the Chinese gov-
ernment promoted educational opportunities for the children of peasants
and workers, favoring them at the expense of those from higher status
backgrounds (see Deng & Treiman, 1997).
Despite the government’s efforts to reduce material inequalities, regions
varied enormously in their natural endowments and levels of economic
development. Egalitarianism of the commune system was not efficient in
redressing this resource differential. In fact, the state policy of local
self-reliance reinforced interregional inequalities, and the gap of school
provision between cities and countryside remained wide (Stockman, 2000).
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State interventions for reducing class differences during the first three
decades of the People’s Republic of China obviously increased the
resources of some couples and decreased others. Did couples of different
occupational backgrounds also converge on their parental investment
strategies? Or did white-collar couples still choose offspring quality over
quantity (and vice versa for blue-collar couples)? Was there any difference
in the parental investment strategies between urban and rural couples or
couples from different regions of China?
To answer these questions, I compare the lifetime reproductive success,
and years of education children received, for married couples of different
occupational status from different parts of China (Hebei, Shaanxi, and
Shanghai). Specifically, I focus on women who were at the end of their
reproductive careers in the mid-1980s: their children were born and grew
up during the first three decades of the communist regime when various
policies for eliminating inequalities took place.
To incorporate the effects of region, I examine women’s lives in three
provinces (although Shanghai is actually a municipality). Hebei, Shaanxi,
and Shanghai have different ecological, demographic and economic char-
acteristics. Shanghai includes the biggest city in China, and is the most
economically developed site. Hebei and Shaanxi are rural. Shaanxi is the
poorest of the three provinces. Comparisons across provinces reveal some
differences in women’s reproductive strategies; however, there are many
co-variates across whole provinces. Thus, within-province comparisons are
required to examine in detail how regional variations or inequalities affect
the life history strategies for people of different backgrounds in these
different environments.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Hebei, Shaanxi, and Shanghai have different ecological, demographic,
and economic characteristics. Hebei, a coastal and mainly rural province, is
located on the North China Plain. Shaanxi, an inland rural province on the
middle reaches of the Yellow River, is located in the center of China. Sit-
uated just south of the Yangtze Estuary, Shanghai is one of the largest ports
in China and biggest cities in the world. Although, it is mainly urban,
Shanghai still has a sizeable (about 38%) rural population (Dankert & van
Ginneken, 1991). Moreover, Shanghai consistently has the highest popu-
lation density in China, while Shaanxi has the lowest among the three
study areas (Wang, 2000). For more details regarding these three areas,




I use data from the 1985 China In-depth Fertility Survey (IDFS), phase I,
carried out by the Department of Population Statistics of the State Statistical
Bureau (SSB) of the PRC, in cooperation with the International Statistical
Institute, Voorburg,The Netherlands. The IDFS was largely inspired by the
example of the World Fertility Survey carried out between 1973 and 1985.
Details of survey methodology and main findings were published in the
Principle Report (SSB, 1986; see also Ting, this issue).
Although, the survey covered women aged 15–49 years, here I con-
sider only those who were aged 45–49 and still in their first marriage.
I chose women aged 45–49 because they had completed their repro-
ductive career, and data on their lifetime reproductive success were
available. I focus on women who were still in their first marriage to
control for possible differential treatment of children of different paternity
(Anderson et al., 1999). Despite the first marriage criterion, I consider this
selected sample of women to be representative, because the majority of
women aged 45–49 when the survey took place were still in their first
marriage. Over 90% of women in Hebei and Shanghai, and 85% of
women in Shaanxi, were still in their first marriage when the survey took
place. This sample includes 524 women from Hebei, 429 from Shaanxi,
and 464 from Shanghai.
Occupational Classification
I classify different family backgrounds solely based on husbands’
occupations, because 45% of women in the selected sample said they never
worked (more likely they meant they worked without compensation). I
group husbands’ occupations, which make up approximately 150 occu-
pational codes, into two different categories: white-collar professions and
blue-collar professions.
White-collar professions include professionals and administrators (cf.
Lin & Xie, 1988). Professionals are scientific researchers, physicians, eco-
nomic planners, legal professionals, engineering technicians, teachers,
health technicians and assistants, finance and accounting staff, and so forth.
Administrators are managers for government agencies, party committees,
people’s organizations and institutions. Blue-collar jobs include
clerical/sales workers, service workers, peasants and manual workers (cf.
Lin & Xie, 1988). Clerical/sales workers include administrative staff, sales-
men, procurement staff, and so on. Service workers are various attendants,
cooks and kitchen staff, and repairmen for household goods. Peasants are
mostly grain farmers. Manual workers include miners, foundry workers,
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chemical workers, textile workers, food-processing workers, bench work-
ers, machine operators, electricians, construction workers, and so forth.
Analysis
Income. When considering trade-offs, ‘‘phenotypic correlation’’ often
obscures the issue at hand (Lessells, 1991; Low, 2000a, pp. 16–17). A trade-
off occurs when a limiting resource can be spent on one thing or the other, but
not both. However, individuals often differ in their resources, and they may
also differ in how they might best allocate their resources (Lessells, 1991).
Thus, comparing individuals with different levels of income might not reveal
a trade-off. For example, if couples with different occupations also differ in
their income, those with more money can choose to invest more and have
more children at the same time, rather than focus only on offspring quality. As
a result of this ‘‘phenotypic correlation’’ we might not observe the trade-off
between the quantity and quality of offspring. Therefore, I test whether there
are differences in incomes among couples of different occupation.
Lifetime reproductive success. I use multiple regression analysis to
examine how married couples from each of the study areas (Hebei, Shaanxi,
and Shanghai) with different occupational backgrounds differed in their
lifetime reproductive success. For each province, I use separate analyses for
all couples, only urban couples, and only rural couples.
I use survey information on the number of living children (not children
ever-born) as an estimate of a couple’s lifetime reproductive success.
Husband’s occupation is an independent variable in all analyses.
Education. I use multiple regression to test for differences in the
number of years of education received for children born to couples of dif-
ferent occupational status in each of the three provinces. For each province,
three analyses were conducted. The first applied to all children; the second
included only urban children and the third only rural children.
I calculate the numbers of years of education children have based on the
survey information on their education levels (primary, secondary, senior
high, and college) and their grade at that particular level. Only children aged
seven and older are included in the analyses, because seven is the typical age
for starting elementary school (Hannum & Xie, 1994). I control for both
child’s age and sex in all analyses for the following reasons. First, the older
the child is, the more schooling she/he is likely to have. Second, historically
there has been a gender gap in educational attainment in China; sons are





‘‘Income’’ refers to a couple’s present monthly income when the survey was
conducted in 1985. Across provinces, urban couples had higher monthly
income than rural couples; however,white-collar families did not have higher
income than blue-collar families, whether in urban or rural parts of each
province (Tables 1-a to 1-c).With the exception of the urban–rural divide, the
income distribution tended to be egalitarian among families of different
backgrounds. Thus, it is appropriate to compare white-collar with blue-collar
workers regarding their investment allocation among children in this case.
Lifetime Reproductive Success
When examining the province as a whole, white-collar couples had
fewer living children than blue-collar couples in Hebei and Shanghai.
Urban couples also had fewer living children than rural couples in
Shaanxi and Shanghai (Tables 2a–c). Within each province, white-collar
couples in urban areas had fewer living children than their blue-collar
counterparts. However, among rural couples, there was no difference in
lifetime reproductive success between white-collar and blue-collar
workers (Tables 2a–c).
Table 1a
Multiple Regression Analysis on Monthly Income According to Husband’s
Occupation: Hebei Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 74.79 3.82**** 134.54 8.56**** 73.76 3.63****
Urban versus Rurald 56.15 7.39****
White-versus
Blue-collare
7.52 9.09 )5.23 16.10 17.47 11.29
aN = 524, F(2, 521) = 32.19, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.11.
bN = 138, F(1, 136) = 0.11, p = 0.75, R2 = 0.00.
cN = 386, F(1, 384) = 2.40, p = 0.12, R2 = 0.01.
dResidence: urban = 1, rural = 0





Across provinces, children in urban areas had more education than
children in rural areas. The older the children were, of course, the more
education they had. When all children were considered, children born to
white-collar families received more schooling than those born to blue-
collar families (Tables 3a–c). In the urban part of each province, children
Table 1c
Multiple Regression Analysis on Monthly Income According to Husband’s
Occupation: Shanghai Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.






12.81 10.52 18.16 12.19 )1.36 20.48
aN = 464, F(2, 461) = 18.69, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.08.
bN = 280, F(1, 278) = 2.22, p = 0.14, R2 = 0.01.
cN = 184, F(1, 182) = 0 , p = 0.95, R2 = 0.00.
dResidence: urban = 1, rural = 0.
eHusband’s occupation: white-collar = 1, blue-collar = 0.
****p < 0.0005.
Table 1b
Multiple Regression Analysis on Monthly Income According to Husband’s
Occupation: Shaanxi Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 52.39 3.58**** 124.25 8.67**** 52.67 3.01****
Urban versus Rurald 72.77 6.76****
White-versus
Blue-collare
11.38 8.73 14.28 15.50 7.63 10.87
aN = 429, F(2, 426) = 69.60, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.25.
bN = 128, F(1, 126) = 0.85, p = 0.36, R2 = 0.01.
cN = 301, F(1, 299) = 0.49, p = 0.48, R2 = 0.00.
d Residence: urban = 1, rural = 0.




of white-collar background stayed in school longer than their blue-collar
counterparts. The same pattern also holds true in the rural part of each
province (Tables 3a–c).
Table 2b
Multiple Regression Analysis on Number of Living Children for Married
Couples According to Husband’s Occupation: Shaanxi Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient. S.E.






–0.39 0.22 –0.62 0.25* –0.10 0.35
aN = 429, F(2, 426) = 8.83, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.04.
bN = 128, F(1, 126) = 6.26, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.05.
cN = 301, F(1, 299) = 0.09, p = 0.77, R2 = 0.00.
dResidence: urban = 1, rural = 0.
eHusband’s occupation: white-collar = 1, blue-collar = 0.




Multiple Regression Analysis on Number of Living Children for Married
Couples According to Husband’s Occupation: Hebei Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.






)0.59 0.18*** )1.22 0.25**** )0.10 0.24
aN = 524, F(2, 521) = 7.98, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.03.
bN = 138, F(1, 136) = 23.87, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.15.
cN = 386, F(1, 384) = 0.18, p = 0.68, R2 = 0.00.
dResidence: urban = 1, reural = 0.






Multiple Regression Analysis on Number of Living Children for Married
Couples According to Husband’s Occupation: Shanghai Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.






)0.37 0.10**** –0.54 0.11**** 0.07 0.19
aN = 464, F(2, 461) = 16.37, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.07.
bN = 280, F(1, 278) = 22.60, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.08.
cN = 184, F(1, 182) = 0.13, p = 0.72, R2 = 0.00.
dResidence: urban = 1, rural = 0.




Multiple Regression Analysis on Years of Education Children Received
According to Father’s Occupation: Hebei Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.




Child’s Age 0.34 0.02**** 0.37 0.03**** 0.32 0.02****
Male versus
Femalee
0.48 0.14*** –0.16 0.29 0.67 0.16****
White- versus
Blue-collarf
1.47 0.22**** 2.02 0.35**** 1.09 0.27****
aN = 1525, F(4, 1520) = 138.68, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.27.
bN = 345, F(3, 341) = 54.39, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.32.
cN = 1180, F(3, 1176) = 109.61, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.22.
dResidence: urban =1, rural = 0.
eChild’s sex: male = 1, female = 0.





Thus, urban couples had fewer children than rural couples, but their
children received more years of schooling than children of rural couples.
Within each province, urban white-collar couples also had fewer children
than urban blue-collar couples, but their children also received more
schooling than children of urban blue-collar couples. Although no differ-
ence in lifetime reproductive success was found between white-collar and
blue-collar couples in rural areas, children of white-collar background had
significantly more education than children of blue-collar background.
DISCUSSION
The women in this study (aged 45–49 in 1985), along with their spouses,
went through their prime reproductive years during the first 35 years of
history of the People’s Republic of China. Many of the political events, and
state policies, of that period are the sorts that alter reproductive costs and
benefits for couples of different occupational backgrounds. For example,
the central government embarked on several campaigns (e.g., the anti-
Table 3b
Multiple Regression Analysis on Years of Education Children Received
According to Father’s Occupation: Shaanxi Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.




Child’s Age 0.38 0.02**** 0.42 0.03**** 0.36 0.02****
Male versus
Femalee
0.09 0.15 –0.44 0.24 0.29 0.19
White- versus
Blue-collarf
0.97 0.22**** 0.53 0.26* 1.35 0.33****
aN = 1250, F(4, 1245) = 259.23, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.45.
bN = 318, F(3, 314) = 88.85, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.46.
cN = 932, F(3, 928) = 145.40, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.32.
dResidence: urban = 1, rural = 0.
eChild’s sex: male = 1, female = 0.






rightist campaign in the late 1950s, and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s) to downgrade the status of intellectuals and upgrade the status of
manual workers (Lin & Xie, 1988; Schoppa, 2002). In an effort to eliminate
capitalist societies’ privileging of white-collar professions over blue-collar
jobs, much income differentiation between white-collar and blue-collar
workers was eliminated or at least compressed, especially during the period
of the Cultural Revolution (Lin & Xie, 1988; Parish, 1984). At the same time,
for educational opportunities, the children of peasants and workers were
favored—at least, in policy—over children from white-collar families (Deng
& Treiman, 1997; Parish, 1984; Zhou, Moen & Tuma, 1998).
Despite state interventions reducing class differences during revolu-
tionary China, in my study a clear pattern emerges in all provinces: white-
collar couples had a different parental investment strategy than blue collar
couples. Specifically, urban white-collar couples had fewer but better-
educated children (i.e., more years of schooling) than their blue-collar
counterparts; rural white-collar couples also had better educated children
even though they had as many children as rural blue-collar couples. In both
urban and rural areas, couples of different occupational backgrounds
diverged in their parental investment strategies.
Table 3c
Multiple Regression Analysis on Years of Education Children Received
According to Father’s Occupation: Shanghai Province
Totala Urbanb Ruralc
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.




Child’s Age 0.20 0.02**** 0.18 0.02**** 0.25 0.04****
Male versus
Femalee
)0.02 0.14 )0.18 0.17 0.23 0.24
White- versus
Blue-collarf
0.90 0.16**** 0.80 0.18**** 1.09 0.32***
a N = 906, F(4, 901) = 110.41, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.33.
b N = 558, F(3, 554) = 25.08, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.12.
c N = 348, F(3, 344) = 18.66, p < 0.0005, R2 = 0.14.
d Residence: urban = 1, rural = 0.
e Child’s sex: male = 1, female = 0.





Although I found no differences in monthly income between white-
collar and blue-collar couples within either urban or rural areas, across
provinces rural couples consistently had lower monthly income than urban
couples. Rural children also consistently had fewer years of schooling than
urban children. Comparatively, low population density and unskilled labor
market (farming-related work accounts for the majority of labor) in rural
areas do not create the same kind of competitive environment as in urban
areas which have high population densities. Moreover, the government
policy of restricted mobility between urban and rural residence also made it
nearly impossible for rural residents to live and work in the cities, except for
attending higher education institutions and joining the army (Stockman,
2000). Once rural children reached 16 (minimum working age), they
automatically entered the labor force of their production teams and started
to earn income under agricultural collectivization (Peng, 1991, p.79).
Thus, increased parental investment in offspring quality is not neces-
sary to ensure a child’s ability to secure a job in rural China (cf. Kaplan &
Lancaster, 2000). Nevertheless, in rural areas, white-collar parents with
embodied cultural capital, such as knowledge and access to resources,
provided their children with more education than children of blue-collar
background—with no reduction in the number of children.
The fertility transition took place in China’s urban areas long before it
happened in rural areas (Peng, 1991; Scharping, 2003). Here, I found that
urban environments are where trade-offs between offspring quantity and
quality follow couples’ occupational backgrounds. The quantity-quality
trade-off has been central to both economic and evolutionary approaches
in explaining fertility transition (Becker, 1991; Becker & Lewis, 1973;
Borgerhoff Mulder, 2000; Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan & Lancaster, 2000; Lam,
2003; Low, 2000b; Low et al., 1992;MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; Willis,
1973).
The common empirical observation of the fertility transition is that
higher-income and better-educated couples have fewer children than
lower-income and less educated couples. A decrease in the number of
children is offset by an increase in the resources invested in each child, such
as resources for education (see Lam, 2003). Thus, in modern societies with
low child and adult mortality, the payoffs to parental investment in offspring
quality are likely to be large when wages are determined by skill and formal
education (see Kaplan & Lancaster, 2000).
However, income, wages, and educational cost cannot fully explain
the trade-offs between offspring quantity and quality among couples of
different occupational backgrounds in urban China. During the first three
decades of the People’s Republic of China, a wage structure determined by
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the state was not correlated with skill and educational qualifications. The
state, in fact, meant to eliminate income differences among different social
classes.
As a result, formal education was not an important determinant of
personal income (Stockman, 2000). Indeed, I found no differences in the
monthly incomes of white-collar and blue-collar couples in my study.
Further, educational cost was minimum because, to equalize educational
opportunities, the communist government not only expanded the educa-
tional system but also created affordable primary and secondary education
and free tertiary education (Deng & Treiman, 1997). Therefore, blue-collar
children presumably were just as likely as white-collar children to go to
school at any level.
In short, before the economic reform, two features of communist China
deviate from the preconditions of the competitive labor market model (e.g.,
Kaplan & Lancaster, 2000). First, there was no or little income differentia-
tion (except the differences between urban and rural areas). Second, there
was no or little correlation between education and income. Thus, we must
ask: what mechanism would then account for the observed trade-offs be-
tween offspring quantity and quality among urban couples in China? Edu-
cation might be affordable to everyone but, in order to advance to the levels
beyond primary schools, students had to pass the entrance examination at
every level; only during the Cultural Revolution, when advancement was
solely based on class origin and political recommendation, were all
examinations abolished (Parish, 1984; Wang, 2000). Typically, the higher
the level, the stronger was the competition.
White-collar couples, in this sample as well as in general, were better-
educated than blue-collar couples, and thus presumably able to help their
children with school and educational advancement more efficiently than
their less-educated blue-collar counterparts (Kaplan, 1994). In economic
terms, if white-collar parents were able to lower the amount of time re-
quired to produce a unit of quality in their children (i.e., reducing the
shadow price of children), then they would reach diminishing returns on
investments in children at higher levels than blue-collar parents (Becker,
1991; Kaplan & & Lancaster, 2000; Lam, 2003). As a result, the required
investment may have limited the number of children white-collar parents
could afford (see also Low, 2000b; Low et al., 1992).
Increased parental investments should return large payoffs for white-
collar parents in urban areas, even though they had fewer children than
blue-collar parents. Despite movements and policies specifically aimed at
revamping social stratification during the first three decades of the com-
munist regime, surveys carried out in urban cities during the 1980s revealed
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that, across gender, age, and occupational groups, professionals (e.g.,
physicians, scientists, engineers, writers, teachers, and officials) were still
rated as the most prestigious occupations, while heavy-labor workers
and service workers were among the least prestigious occupations (Bian,
1996; Lin & Xie, 1988).
More important than income, members from higher-ranking occupa-
tions were able to take advantage of better collective goods offered by their
work units. Such collective goods included better housing, health care,
child care, pension, recreation, and high-quality schooling that were neither
provided universally by the state nor available on the market (Stockman,
2000). Taken all together, members from higher-ranking work units, such as
white-collar professionals, had a better quality of life than blue-collar
workers. At the same time, urban jobs were assigned by the state on the
basis of academic merit and recommendation from one’s school; higher
levels of education were also required for white-collar professions (Parish,
1984).
Further, during times of economic constriction, children of blue-collar
backgrounds were the first to experience adversities. For example,
increasing urban unemployment, beginning in the early 1960s right after the
Great Leap Forward, forced the government to send youth to the country-
side in hopes of alleviating growing unemployment problems in urban
China. Often, worker and peasant children with poor academic perfor-
mance were sent first (Parish, 1984). Academic achievement thus seemed to
exert significant impacts on the life course of the youth. It was perhaps no
accident that white-collar professions were at the top of the prestige scale.
Regardless of state policies toward interrupting the intergenerational
inheritance of cultural capital, parents’ education and occupation still
affected the educational and occupational attainment for their children
significantly. For example, Zhou, Moen,and Tuma (1998) report that the
proportions advancing to both senior high school and college level were
higher for those whose fathers were cadres or professionals than for those
whose fathers were workers or peasants between 1949 and 1994; these
differences were drastically reduced during the Cultural Revolution. In fact,
for the first time, the proportion of worker and peasant children in college
exceeded that of white-collar children briefly during the mid-1970s. In
other words, fathers with more education and higher positions produced
children who got further in the educational system; those children, in turn,
tended to get better jobs than others (Parish, 1984).
Thus, the reproduction, even inheritance, of social status and cultural
capital continued until the Cultural Revolution, when it was effectively
broken down. Although, the Cultural Revolution succeeded in reducing
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the intergenerational transmission of cultural and social capital in the short
run, intergenerational educational correlations immediately made a
comeback as soon as the era ended (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Zhou et al.,
1998).
In contrast with rural areas in China, high population density and an
occupational structure that incidentally helped reinforce unequal distribu-
tion of cultural capital in the population encouraged urban couples with
different levels of resources (i.e., cultural capital rather than income in this
case) to adopt different reproductive strategies. To be sure, Mao’s China was
much more egalitarian than both industrial capitalist, and less developed,
countries from the same period (Parish, 1984). Nonetheless, we still observe
the trade-offs between offspring quality and quantity for urban couples with
different occupations, which suggests how sensitive human parental
investment strategies can be.
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